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Abstract 
 
This study assesses how information diffusion dampens the adverse effect of market power on 
the price and quantity of loans provided by a panel of 162 banks from 39 African countries for 
the period 2001-2011. The empirical evidence is based on three endogenity-robust estimation 
techniques, namely: (i) Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), (ii) Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) and (iii) Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions (QR). Three key 
results emerge. First, from the GMM results, a mobile phone penetration rate of 54.29, rising 
to 57 per 100 people are predicted to neutralise the adverse effect of market power on the 
average loan price and quantity respectively. Second, from the QR, mobile phone penetration 
rates of 56.20, 52.04 and 42.76 per 100 people is needed to nullify the negative effect of 
market power on loan quantity at the 0.10
th
, 0.25
th
 and 0.90
th
 quintiles respectively. Third, a 
considerably lower internet penetration rate of 9.49 per 100 people is required to counteract 
the negative impact of market power on loan quantity at the 0.90
th
 quintile.   
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1. Introduction  
 
There are four principal motivations for examining whether information diffusion threatens 
market power in order to enhance financial access in the African banking industry.  
First, compared to the rest of the world, there is a higher potential for penetration of 
mechanisms of information technology in Africa. Consistent with recent literature, whereas 
high-end economies in North America, Europe and Asia are witnessing saturation points in 
the growth of information and communication technology (ICT), there is yet considerable  
room for ICT penetration in Africa (Penard et al., 2012; Asongu, 2015). This implies that 
policy can leverage on such penetration potential to address development concerns, inter alia 
limited financial access. 
 Second, banks in Africa are characterised by issues of surplus liquidity (Saxegaard, 
2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014), which is paradoxical in the light of  the experience of 
households and corporations with  limited access to credit (Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; 
Darley, 2012). Some of the documented determinants of surplus liquidity include: lack of 
borrowing collateral, absence of bank accounts, lack of credit histories, absence of good 
infrastructure that may oblige bank branches in remote areas to hold cash in excess of 
statutory limits and the abuse of market power by big banks (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2016).  
 Third, information diffusion can reduce market power or limit data privileges and 
informational rents previously enjoyed by big banks. Big banks can use such advantages to set 
the price of loans above marginal costs in order to increase their profit margins. This intuition 
is consistent with Bergemanny et al. (2015) who have argued that the interaction of market 
power and information is crucial in comprehending the distribution of quantities and prices 
that result in economic equilibrium.   
 Fourth, recent literature has suggested that financial institutions in the African banking 
industry may be abusing their market power in order to limit access to finance (Boateng et al., 
2016). In other words, such financial intermediaries may be more concerned with enjoying a 
‘quiet life’1 instead of increasing financial access (Asongu et al., 2016a). Unfortunately, 
Africa has not been given the scholarly attention it deserves. This is essentially because, as the 
continent with the most severe financial access issues, studies devoted to assessing the 
influence of market power in the African banking industry are sparse (see Table 1).  
                                                          
1
 The Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH) postulates that financial institutions with high market power would invest 
less to enhance financial access. According to the assumption, instead of using their favourable market position 
to enhance intermediation efficiency, such banks tend to exploit such ‘market power’ to increase their gains or 
enjoy a ‘quiet life’ (see Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010). 
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 This inquiry therefore aims to complement existing literature and policy challenges by 
merging the four strands above in assessing how information diffusion dampens the 
potentially negative effect of market power on financial access in the African banking 
industry. The results are linked to have policies which should enhance access to mobilised 
deposits in the banking sector for both households and small businesses. This leads to 
increased consumption, investment, productivity, employment and ultimately economic 
prosperity.  
 The rest of the investigation is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses linkages 
between information flow, market power and financial access. The data and methodology are 
covered in Section 3 while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes with 
future research directions.   
 
2. Information Diffusion, Market Power and Financial Access  
2.1. Information diffusion and theoretical underpinnings  
By playing a fundamental role in information diffusion, ICT improves governance and 
reduces the abuse of government power by facilitating transparency, openness and the free-
flow of information between various institutions and departments in the government (see 
Hellstrom, 20008). For example, in accordance with the narrative, mobile telephony enables: 
(i) the free flow of information between citizens and authorities and (ii) direct involvement of 
citizens in processes of governance.  In summary, advantages of a mobile phone can also be 
reaped in the banking industry because by making financial institutions more connected and  
up-to-date, it encourages customers to be more participative in the process of lending. Such   
could decrease the informational rents previously enjoyed by big banks.  
Ultimately, information flow has the potential for  decreasing the asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers. On the one hand, ex-ante of  lending, information  distribution can 
mitigate the adverse selection of banks (especially big banks) by enabling them to be better 
informed about borrowers’  creditworthiness. On the other, ex-post of lending, the potential 
for moral hazard can be substantially limited because the circulation of information improves 
transparency and accountability. Such should prevent borrowers from concealing activities for 
which they borrowed funds as well as the earning there-from.  
 In the light of the above, the role of ICT in reducing market power in the banking 
industry is not so different from how ICT decreases the abuse of power by the ruling elite.  On 
the potential role of ICT in decreasing market power, Snow (2009, pp. 337-339) has 
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documented some theoretical underpinnings. According to Snow, the historic dearth of ICT 
provided those with power and authority with privileged information and communication 
facilities that substantially constrained transparency and promoted corruption.  
 Conversely, the rapid diffusion of information (by means of ICT) has shrunk the 
secrecy barriers and rents by inter alia: altering cost-benefit calculations and increasing 
oversight.  These propositions are founded on the intuition that information monopoly among 
the elite in government or banking industry is an avenue for the abuse of power. Hence, the 
decentralisation of information through ICT reduces opportunities for those in government 
and banking circles to take advantage of their privileged positions. The theoretical 
foundations are broadly in line with the growing number of papers on the interconnections 
between ICT, governance and the abuse of power on the one hand (see Boulianne, 2009; 
Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 2014) and on the other, the evolving stream of literature on 
the relevance of ICT in collective action against the abuse of power (Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 
2013; Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; Manacorda & Tesei, 2016).  
 
2.2. Market power and financial access  
 Issues surrounding the relationship between market and financial access have occupied 
an important part of scholarly research over the past three decades (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; 
Maudo & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007; Boateng et al., 2016). Such an interest from scholars 
was for the most part inspired by the inefficiencies associated with market power, notably: net 
losses in social and economic welfare (Maudo & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007).  According to 
dominant narratives in the literature, market power reduces investment, lowers savings, 
increases financial intermediation inefficiency and decreases avenues of economic prosperity 
(see Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Djankov et al., 2007).   
 More recent evidence however suggests that in relation to banks with substantial 
market power, smaller banks are associated with lower interest margins (Beck & Hesse, 2006; 
Ahokpossi, 2013). This suggestion is in line with Beck and Hesse (2006) and   Ngigi (2013ab) 
who established that bank size substantially affects differences in cost of loans with associated 
interest rate spreads/margins.  
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Table 1: Summary of empirical literature on the abuse of market power 
Author(s) Regions (Period) Abuse of market power? 
   
Tu & Chen (2000)  Taiwan (1986-1999) Yes 
   
Weill (2004) Europe (1994-1999) No 
   
Maudos & de Guevara (2007) Europe (1993-2002) No 
   
Koetter & Vins (2008) Germany (1996-2006) Yes 
   
Koetter et al. (2008) USA (1986-2006) No 
   
Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) Czech Republic (1994-2005)  No 
   
Schaeck & Cihak (2008) Europe & USA (1995-2005) Yes 
   
Al-Jarrah & Gharaibeh (2009) Jordan (2001-2005) No 
   
 
Solis & Maudos (2008)  
 
Mexico (1993-2005) 
No (for deposit market) 
Yes (for loans market) 
   
Al-Muharrami & Mathews (2009)  Arab Gulf (1993-2002) No 
   
Fan & Marton (2011) SEE  (1998-2008) No 
   
Fu & Heffernan (2009) China (1985-2002) No 
   
Delis & Tsionas (2009) Europe (1996-2006) Yes 
   
Fu & Heffernan (2009)  China (1985-2002) No 
   
Punt &van Rooij(2009) EU (1992-1997) No 
   
Ariss (2010) A sample of developing countries 
(1999-2005) 
Yes (cost efficiency) 
 No (profit efficiency) 
   
Coccorese & Pellecchia (2010) Italy (1992-2007) Yes 
   
Tetsushi et al. (2012) Japan (1974-2005) Yes 
   
Titko & Dauylbaev (2015) Baltic countries (2007-2013) No 
   
Sources: Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010); Titko and Dauylbaev (2015) and Authors. SEE: South East European countries. EU: Europe 
Union.  
 
From a theoretical perspective it is expected that banks with higher market power are 
more likely to maintain lower margins of interest because of economies of scale and other 
inherent advantages associated with size. Large sized banks may however, pursue objectives 
of financial intermediation inefficiency with the core purpose of increasing their profit 
margins (see Mitchell & Onvural, 1996). Unfortunately, the African continent is not receiving 
the scholarly attention it deserves in the literature on market power, despite being the 
continent with the most severe constraints to financial access. As summarised in Table 1, with 
the exception of the study by Ariss (2010) which has sampled a few African countries, the 
bulk of the literature on market power has not involved the continent.  
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3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data 
 This study examines 39 countries consisting of a panel of 162 banks with data for the 
period 2001-2011
2
. The data sources are World Development Indicators of the World Bank 
and Bankscope. The adopted periodicity, number of countries and number of banks are due to 
constraints in the availability of data. Market power is proxied with the Lerner index, which 
represents the ability of banks to set prices above marginal cost. Banks with a higher index are 
associated with greater market power. The choice of the Lerner index is consistent with recent 
literature (Ariss, 2010; Boateng et al., 2016). Steps to computing the index used in this study 
can found in Boateng et al. (2016).   
Following recent African ICT literature (Tchamyou, 2015), we use two ICT indicators, 
namely: the mobile phone penetration rate (per 100 people) and the internet penetration rate 
(per 100 people). The adoption of these variables is consistent with stylized facts on the high 
penetration potential of ICT in Africa (see Penard et al., 2012). The dependent variables used 
in approximation of financial access are: loan price and loan quantity. These are measured 
respectively with ‘price charged on loans’ and ‘the logarithms of outstanding loan balances’ 
(Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010).  
  Consistent with discussion in the recent African banking literature (see Asongu & Le 
Roux, 2016), three categories of control variables are used. These include: (i) market-oriented 
characteristics (comprising GDP per capita growth; Inflation and Population density); (ii) 
bank-related features (involving the number of Bank branches and the Deposit/Asset ratio) 
and (iii) the unobserved firm heterogeneity such as ‘compliance with Sharia finance’ (Non-
Islamic versus (vs) Islamic); size (large vs. small) and ownership structure (foreign vs. 
domestic). The expected signs are discussed in what follows.  
 First, GDP per capita growth which takes business cycle fluctuations into account 
should positively influence loan quantity. Conversely, the expected effect on the price of 
loans is not easy to establish because such impact is contingent on both market dynamism and 
expansion. Hence, it is proposed that diminishing GDP per capita can influence both loan 
quantity and loan price in a scenario of decreasing demand. A negative impact may be 
                                                          
2
 The sampled countries are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and 
Zambia. 
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expected from GDP per capita because over the past decade, GDP has been growing less 
proportionately than population growth (see Asongu, 2013).   
Second, we expect the density of the population to positively impact both dependent 
variables. This is because, from intuition, an increasing demand for loans owing to rising 
population density is likely to raise loan prices.  
Third, the quantity (price) of loans should be logically decreased (increased) with 
inflation, other things being equal. To be sure, the rate of investment with associated demand 
for loans is expected to decline in periods of economic uncertainty (like rampant inflation). 
Consequently, the interest charged (or price of the loan) is likely to fall  during periods of 
high inflation. This perception builds on the evidence that investors are more encouraged with 
less ambiguous economic environments (see Le Roux & Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey & Le Roux, 
2016).  
Fourth, the number of bank branches is expected to positively affect loan quantity and 
negatively impact the price of loans.  
Fifth, raising the ‘deposit to asset’ ratio is anticipated to increase both the quantity and 
price of loans. This is primarily because mobilised deposits are the principal source of bank 
financing. Hence, more liquid liabilities increase interest rate margins and/or quantity of 
loans, since good organisation and asset-liability management are imperative for the 
mobilisation of such bank resources.  
Sixth, anticipated effects from dummy variables which are used to account for the 
unobserved heterogeneity are not easy to establish. For instance, regardless of bank size 
(small versus (vs). big), financial intermediation can be associated with both positive and 
negative effects resulting from movements in the credit market, although the adverse 
experience of large financial institutions are expected to be mitigated by their more 
sophisticated management and coordination systems. Nevertheless, addressing challenges that 
are naturally linked to the complications of dealing with a larger customer base is likely to be 
a source of inefficiency for large banks. In the same vein, the influence of heterogeneity in 
ownership structure (domestic vs. foreign) and ‘Sharia finance compliance’ (Non-islamic vs. 
Islamic) are contingent on a plethora of features such as: organisational mission and capacities 
as well as market dynamics.  
 Appendix 1 summarises the expected signs whereas Appendix 2, Appendix 3 and 
Appendix 4 show the definitions of variables (with their corresponding sources), the summary 
statistics and the correlation matrix in that order.  
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3.2 Methodology  
3.2.1 Generalised Method of Moments: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions 
 The adoption of the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) builds on five principal 
motivations. The first-two motivations are basic requirements for the choice of the technique 
whereas the last-three are corresponding advantages of employing the estimation approach. (i) 
Persistence in the dependent variable is taken into account by the estimation technique. 
Accordingly, the rule of thumb (0.800) for persistence in loan price and  quantity is satisfied 
because the correlation between these financial access variables and their first lags are 
respectively 0.845 and 0.996. (ii) The T<N criterion for the GMM strategy is also satisfied 
because there are 162 banks for a span of 11 years. Therefore, the number of banks (N) is 
substantially higher than the number of years (T) in each bank. (iii) The estimation approach 
controls for errors arising from (i) simultaeniety and (ii) time-invariant omitted variables in 
the regression model. (iv) The use of panel data framework helps to control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity across our bank units. (v) The system GMM estimator addresses 
inherent biases that are associated with the difference GMM estimator.  
 The empirical strategy adopted in this study is the Roodman (2009ab) extension of 
Arellano and Bover (1995). In essence, instead of employing the first-difference of the 
variables as instruments, the technique uses forward orthogonal deviations that have been 
documented in restrict instrument proliferation and/or limit over-identification (see Baltagi, 
2008; Love & Zicchino, 2006). A two-step procedure is adopted in place of the one-step 
process because it corrects for heteroscedasticity.   
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation 
procedure for loan quantity.  
 tititih
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           where, tiLQ ,  
is loan quantity  of bank i
 
at  period t ,  is a constant,
 
 represents the 
coefficient of auto-regression, ICT  represents information and communication technology 
(mobile phone or internet penetration), MP  denotes Market Power approximated by the 
Lerner index, Inter  is the interaction between ICT and MP.
 
W  is the vector of control 
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variables  (GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets, Bank 
Branches)),
 i

 
are bank-specific effects (Small banks, Domestic banks and Islamic banks), t  
is the time-specific constant and ti ,  the error term. Equations (1) and (2) are replicated when 
the dependent variable is loan price. 
 It is important to discuss restrictions in identification and exclusion that are essential 
for a robust GMM specification.  In line with the recent literature, we consider all explanatory 
variables as suspected endogenous or predetermined while the time-invariant omitted 
variables are considered to be strictly exogenous (see Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). The 
identification condition is motivated by the awareness that it is not feasible for time-invariant 
omitted variables or ‘years’ to be endogenous in first-difference (Roodman, 2009b)3.  
 The statistical validity of the underlying exclusion restriction is investigated with the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments.  A failure to reject the 
null hypothesis of DHT implies that years or time invariant omitted variables explain loan 
price and quantity exclusively through the suspected endogenous variables. In the standard 
Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy, a rejection of the null hypothesis corresponding to the 
Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) is taken as a signal of the invalidity of the 
employed instruments (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b). This is not the 
case with the GMM with forward orthogonal deviations which employs the DHT as 
information criterion for exclusion restriction. Therefore, in the findings that are provided in 
Section 4, the exclusion restriction assumption is confirmed if the alternative hypothesis of 
the DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is rejected. 
 
3.2.2 Instrumental Quantile regressions 
 The modelling strategy covered with the GMM strategy is based on mean values of 
loan price and loan quantity. This represents a shortfall of the implied blanket policies. 
Moreover, the underlying blanket policies may not be effective across countries with high, 
intermediate and low existing levels of financial access unless they are related to their initial 
levels of loan price and quantity. It is important to note that modelling exclusively at the 
conditional mean of loan price and quantity is addressed with the Quantile Regressions (QR) 
estimation technique because it examines the linkages throughout the conditional distributions 
                                                          
3
 Hence, the process for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ while the gmmstyle is used for 
predetermined variables.  
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of the dependent variable (see Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & 
Samreth, 2012). Such an approach to understanding credit access has recently been used in 
clarifying the nexus between information sharing and financial access in Africa (see Asongu 
et al., 2016b). In the light of the above points, empirical studies that examine such effects with 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are based on the assumption that the errors terms are normally 
distributed.  This proposition does not hold in the QR approach. Furthermore, assessing the 
robustness of parameter estimates at several points on the conditional distribution of loan 
price and quantity is consistent when outliers are apparent (Koenker & Bassett, 1978).  
The  th quintile estimator of financial access is obtained by solving the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (3) 
   






 
 
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
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i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
 ,                                                      (3) 
where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, it is the weighted sum of absolute deviations that is minimised. 
For example, the 25
th
 or 90
th
 quintiles (with  =0.25 or 0.90 respectively) are examined by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of credit access or iy given ix is 
expressed as followed: 
 iiy xxQ )/( ,                                                                                                              (4) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This formulation is 
analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of loan price and loan quantity. In Eq. (4), the dependent 
variable iy  is the financial access variable (consisting of loan quantity and loan price 
respectively) whereas ix  contains a constant term, mobile phone penetration, internet 
penetration, GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets, Number of 
Bank Branches, and bilateral dummy variables representing Small banks, domestic banks and 
Islamic banks.  
 The issue of endogeneity is addressed by instrumenting the ICT variables with their 
first lags. For instance, the instrumentation process of mobile phone penetration is disclosed 
in Eq. (5) below. 
  titijti MobileMobile ,1,,   
 
 ,                                                                                  (5) 
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where tiMobile , , is the mobile phone penetration rate of bank i  
at  period t ,  is a constant, 
1, tiMobile , represents the mobile penetration indicator for bank i  
at  the previous period 
1t , and ti ,  the error term.  
 The instrumentation process in Eq. (5) which is replicated for internet penetration 
consists of regressing an ICT variable on its first lags and then saving the fitted values which 
are then employed as the independent variables of interest in the OLS and QR. The 
specifications are Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in terms of 
standard errors. Moreover, through instrumentation, the OLS approach is transformed to a 
Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) that accounts for both simultaneity and the unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 2 below presents the GMM results whereas Tables 3-4 show the findings corresponding 
to the Quantile regressions. Consistent variations in the estimated coefficients from the Two 
Stage Least Squares and Quantile regressions (in terms of sign, size and magnitude of 
significance) justify  our decision the adopt Quantile regression method. 
 For each dimension of financial access in Table 2, there are four specifications: two 
related to mobile phone penetration and two linked to internet penetration. Both ICT variables 
have two sub-specifications corresponding to full and partial samples. Whereas the partial 
sample is from 2005 to 2011, the full sample is for the period 2001-2011. The prime 
motivation underpinning the partial sample is that it helps to restrict instrument proliferation 
or over-identification since N is held constant while T is reduced. Four principal information 
criteria are employed to examine the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal 
deviations
4
  and the findings are discussed based on these information criteria.  
The results are discussed in terms of marginal impacts, net effects and thresholds at 
which the policy variables (mobile phone penetration and internet penetration) influence 
market power to increase financial access in terms of loan price and loan quantity. For ICT to 
enhance financial access, marginal effects from interactions with market power should be 
                                                          
4 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2016, p.9). 
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negative and positive for loan price and loan quantity respectively. For example in the partial 
sample regression in third column of Table 2,  the net impact on average loan prices  of using 
mobile phones to effect changes in market power is positive (0.014)
5
. By contrast, the 
corresponding marginal effect (or conditional impact of market power) is negative (-0.0007).  
The implication is that a threshold of 54.285 (i.e., 0.038/0.0007) penetration per 100 people is 
required to reverse the sign of the unconditional effect of market power (0.038) from positive 
to negative. With respect to the average loan quantity regression, a threshold of 57 penetration 
per 100 people (i.e., 0.114/0.002) is required to counteract the positive impact of market 
power.  These estimated cut-off points are within the mobile phone penetration range of 0.000 
to 147.202 provided by the summary statistics. Interestingly, Internet penetration has no 
apparent impact on both loan price and quantity in all the regressions. Most of the significant 
control variables display the expected signs. . 
The following findings can be established in Table 3 on the role of the mobile phones 
in mitigating the adverse effect of market power on financial access. There are no statistically 
significant relationships apparent from the ‘loan price’-oriented regressions. By contrast, from 
the ‘loan quantity’-related regressions, there are positive marginal effects and net negative 
effects reported for the bottom and 0.90
th
 quintiles. The corresponding thresholds beyond 
which the unconditional negative effects of market power on loan quantity could be reversed 
to positive are 56.202,  52.040 and 42.761 penetration per 100 people at the 0.10
th
, 0.25
th
 and 
0.90
th
 quintiles respectively. Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. 
The following findings can be established in Table 4 on the role of internet penetration 
in reducing market power for financial access. Again, whereas no significantly relevant 
results are apparent from ‘loan price’-oriented regressions, for ‘loan quantity’-related 
regressions, there is a positive marginal effect and net a negative effect only in the 0.90
th
 
quintile. The corresponding threshold beyond which the unconditional negative impact of 
market power on loan quantity could be reversed is 9.485 per 100 people penetration. Again, 
most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 The net effect on the average loan price is computed from the interaction between mobile phones and market 
power on the one hand and unconditional market power effects on the other: That is 0.014 = ([-0.0007× 34.107] 
+ 0.038).  Where the mean value of mobile phone penetration is 34.107, the unconditional effect of market 
power equals 0.038 and the corresponding conditional impact of it estimated to be -0.0007.  
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Table 2: Financial access effects of reducing market power with ICT (GMM-IV)   
         
 Dependent variable: Financial Access  
 Loan Price Effects  Loan Quantity Effects  
 Mobile Phone Penetration  Internet Penetration  Mobile Phone Penetration  Internet Penetration  
 Full Sample Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full Sample Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Constant  0.028** -0.204** 0.042*** -0.013 0.502*** 0.153 0.261*** -0.064 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.001) (0.767) (0.000) (0.439) (0.000) (0.699) 
Price of Loans (-1) 0.580*** 0.549*** 0.571*** 0.778*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Quantity of Loans  (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.959*** 1.026*** 0.992*** 1.012*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Power  0.009 0.038** -0.012 0.009 -0.062 0.114** -0.080 0.042 
 (0.296) (0.023) (0.204) (0.516) (0.330) (0.041) (0.127) (0.498) 
Mobile 0.0001 0.0002 --- --- -0.001 0.001** --- --- 
 (0.230) (0.155)   (0.107) (0.043)   
Internet --- --- -0.0001 -0.00005 --- --- -0.001 0.001 
   (0.688) (0.916)   (0.624) (0.430) 
Mobile×Market Power  -0.0003 -0.0007*** --- --- 0.0001 -0.002*** --- --- 
 (0.127) (0.006)   (0.897) (0.009)   
Internet×Market Power --- --- 0.0008 -0.0001 --- --- -0.002 -0.001 
   (0.261) (0.845)   (0.430) (0.718) 
GDPpcg 0.0001 0.0008 0.0001 0.00007 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (0.676) (0.105) (0.730) (0.838) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Inflation  0.0001** -0.0000004 0.0002*** 0.0001* -0.0001 -0.00009 0.00003 -0.00004 
 (0.031) (0.995) (0.002) (0.098) (0.207) (0.336) (0.723) (0.598) 
Pop. density 0.00003** -0.000001 0.00002*** 0.00002** -0.0001 0.00006 0.00006 0.00004 
 (0.011) (0.959) (0.002) (0.037) (0.229) (0.424) (0.183) (0.590) 
Deposit/Assets 0.024 0.042 0.029* 0.086** -0.165* 0.156 -0.189** 0.150 
 (0.102) (0.123) (0.051) (0.011) (0.095) (0.162) (0.014) (0.197) 
Bank Branches -0.0003 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 0.003* -0.002 0.001 -0.004** 
 (0.342) (0.033) (0.001) (0.035) (0.074) (0.297) (0.456) (0.026) 
Net effect of Mobile na 0.014 --- --- na 0.045 --- --- 
Threshold of Mobile na 54.285 --- --- na nsa --- --- 
Net effect of Internet --- --- na na --- --- na na 
Threshold of Internet --- --- na na --- --- na na 
AR(1) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.159) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.080) (0.168) (0.129) (0.497) (0.025) (0.341) (0.029) (0.823) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.055) (0.000) (0.019) 
Hansen OIR (0.009) (0.400) (0.010) (0.258) (0.018) (0.101) (0.005) (0.149) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.147) (0.103) (0.125) (0.405) (0.303) (0.225) (0.219) (0.104) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.013) (0.744) (0.016) (0.233) (0.013) (0.127) (0.004) (0.324) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.044) (0.267) (0.165) (0.435) (0.177) (0.156) (0.005) (0.141) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.031) (0.706) (0.004) (0.133) (0.019) (0.164) (0.179) (0.349) 
         
Fisher  66.03*** 32.29*** 53.45*** 28.60*** 797.57*** 2774.03*** 1613.18*** 2248.70*** 
Instruments  42 41 42 41 42 41 42 41 
Banks 135 108 135 107 137 108 137 107 
Observations  646 139 633 138 656 139 643 138 
         
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients  and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) andAR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. nsa: not specifically 
applicable because the threshold effect is contrary to theoretical underpinnings. Mean value of Mobile is 34.107. Mean value of Internet is 
7.268. Range of Mobile: 0.000 to 147.202. Range of Internet is 0.037 to 51.000.  
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Table 3: Financial Access Effects of reducing Market Power  with Mobile Phone (2SLS and IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Financial Access 
 Loan Price Effects  Loan Quantity Effects  
 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  0.117*** 0.056 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.120*** 0.166*** 6.083*** 4.455*** 5.941*** 5.874*** 5.382*** 6.614*** 
 (0.000) (0.274) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Power (IV) -0.014 0.014 -0.032 0.008 -0.0001 -0.055 -4.758*** -4.159*** -5.152*** -4.719* -2.875* -2.694*** 
 (0.770) (0.879) (0.513) (0.865) (0.997) (0.383) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.076) (0.070) (0.000) 
Mobile (IV) -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.00004 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.053*** -0.037** -0.051** -0.054 -0.028 -0.029*** 
 (0.742) (0.871) (0.662) (0.950) (0.758) (0.867) (0.004) (0.043) (0.041) (0.135) (0.190) (0.001) 
Mobile(IV) ×Market Power(IV) 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0002 0.101*** 0.074** 0.099** 0.096 0.061 0.063*** 
 (0.797) (0.805) (0.518) (0.932) (0.678) (0.849) (0.002) (0.019) (0.022) (0.126) (0.100) (0.000) 
GDPpcg -0.0007* -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.00008 -0.008 0.013 -0.036** -0.031 -0.004 -0.009 
 (0.088) (0.276) (0.801) (0.293) (0.333) (0.919) (0.515) (0.190) (0.030) (0.262) (0.789) (0.125) 
Inflation  0.0001 0.00005 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 0.002* 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.002 0.0008* 
 (0.138) (0.214) (0.029) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (0.001) (0.184) (0.260) (0.077) 
Pop. Density 0.00002 0.00004* 0.00004*** 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001 -0.0008*** -0.0003* 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.001* -0.0008* 
 (0.116) (0.061) (0.000) (0.259) (0.447) (0.480) (0.008) (0.068) (0.494) (0.871) (0.098) (0.077) 
Deposit/Assets 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.012 0.004 2.095*** 1.058*** 1.746*** 2.234*** 2.370*** 1.243*** 
 (0.555) (0.504) (0.660) (0.665) (0.264) (0.724) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Branches -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.065*** -0.016** -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.087*** -0.073*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  0.008** 0.015* 0.004 0.001 0.011** 0.011 -0.809*** -0.674*** -1.306*** -0.752*** -0.527*** -0.430*** 
 (0.030) (0.058) (0.238) (0.677) (0.028) (0.102) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
Domestic Banks 0.003 -0.004 0.0004 0.006* 0.006 0.007 0.308*** 0.021 0.240* 0.516** 0.510*** 0.425*** 
 (0.333) (0.425) (0.877) (0.079) (0.155) (0.265) (0.005) (0.824) (0.092) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  -0.022*** 0.0001 -0.022*** -0.038*** -0.014 -0.027** -0.417** 0.283 -0.166 -0.302 -0.529 -1.142*** 
 (0.003) (0.992) (0.007) (0.000) (0.242) (0.034) (0.034) (0.144) (0.653) (0.585) (0.139) (0.000) 
             
Net effect of the Mobile na na na na na na -1.019 -1.419 -1.487 na na -0.361 
Threshold of Mobile na na na na na na 47.108 56.202 52.040 na na 42.761 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.124 0.098 0.094 0.075 0.075 0.068 0.218 0.089 0.115 0.156 0.132 0.130 
Fisher  8.29***      27.50***      
Observations  620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. 2SLS: Two Stage Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial access is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effect of market power.  Mean value of IVMobile is 37.019. Range of IVMobile: 4.332 to 152.599.  
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Table 4: Financial Access Effects of reducing Market Power with the Internet (2SLS and IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Financial Access 
 Loan Prices Effects  Loan Quantity Effects  
 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  0.128*** 0.065** 0.111*** 0.120*** 0.162*** 0.174*** 4.485*** 3.597*** 2.924*** 3.473*** 4.321*** 7.650*** 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Power (IV) -0.024 -0.0004 -0.027 -0.013 -0.043 -0.060 -1.833* -2.463* -0.317 -0.410 -1.045 -2.637*** 
 (0.499) (0.992) (0.501) (0.700) (0.231) (0.282) (0.071) (0.067) (0.845) (0.764) (0.130) (0.000) 
Internet (IV) -0.001 0.0001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.069 -0.083 0.052 0.049 -0.020 -0.131*** 
 (0.436) (0.955) (0.452) (0.560) (0.627) (0.338) (0.318) (0.350) (0.632) (0.585) (0.654) (0.000) 
Internet(IV)×Market Power(IV) 0.002 -0.0008 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.157 0.182 -0.078 -0.022 0.094 0.278*** 
 (0.520) (0.867) (0.479) (0.600) (0.685) (0.428) (0.204) (0.261) (0.687) (0.892) (0.252) (0.000) 
GDPpcg -0.0007* -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.014 0.012 -0.013 0.001 -0.017 -0.026** 
 (0.096) (0.309) (0.459) (0.247) (0.703) (0.794) (0.262) (0.164) (0.457) (0.964) (0.262) (0.030) 
Inflation  0.0001 0.00005 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0003*** 0.0005*** 0.002 0.002*** 0.005** 0.003 0.001 0.0008 
 (0.123) (0.220) (0.175) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.000) (0.010) (0.244) (0.317) (0.145) 
Pop. Density 0.00002** 0.00004* 0.00004** 0.00003* 0.000008 0.000008 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.00004 -0.00006 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.032) (0.066) (0.013) (0.075) (0.637) (0.700) (0.002) (0.000) (0.923) (0.920) (0.005) (0.000) 
Deposit/Assets -0.0001 0.010 -0.003 -0.0003 -0.003 0.005 2.099*** 1.228*** 2.091*** 2.279*** 2.641*** 0.264 
 (0.989) (0.479) (0.766) (0.976) (0.746) (0.726) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.165) 
Bank Branches -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.070*** -0.022** -0.037** -0.101*** -0.095*** -0.078*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.018) (0.000) (0.034) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  0.008* 0.014* 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.011 -0.785*** -0.672*** -1.313*** -0.905*** -0.572*** -0.689*** 
 (0.057) (0.067) (0.154) (0.429) (0.634) (0.211) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Banks 0.003 -0.006 0.001 0.008* 0.008 0.011 0.332*** -0.004 0.267 0.370** 0.621*** 0.566*** 
 (0.306) (0.251) (0.819) (0.060) (0.111) (0.145) (0.003) (0.965) (0.118) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  -0.030*** -0.0006 -0.025* -0.040*** -0.050*** -0.035 -0.432* 0.227 -0.068 -0.512 -0.499 -1.220*** 
 (0.000) (0.972) (0.053) (0.004) (0.001) (0.108) (0.092) (0.419) (0.881) (0.344) (0.163) (0.000) 
             
Net effect of the Internet na na na na na na na na na na na -0.466 
Threshold of Internet na na na na na na na na na na na 9.485 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.131 0.103 0.095 0.082 0.077 0.072 0.201 0.079 0.104 0.149 0.113 0.116 
Fisher  7.64***      25.45***      
Observations  601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. 2SLS: Two Stage Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial access is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effect of market power.  Mean value of IVInternet is 7.809. Range of IVInternet is 0.786 to 57.230.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
17 
 
5. Conclusions and future research directions  
 
This study has assessed how information diffusion dampens the adverse effect of market 
power on financial access. It focuses on a panel of 162 banks from 39 African countries for 
the period 2001-2011. The empirical evidence is based on three simultaneity-robust 
estimation techniques, namely: (i) Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), (ii) Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM) and (iii) Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions  (QR). The 
following key results are identified. First, from the GMM findings, a mobile phone 
penetration rate of 54.285 and 57 per 100 people neutralises the positive effect of market 
power on loan price and quantity in that order. Second, from the QR, mobile phone 
penetration rates of 56.202, 52.040 and 42.761 per 100 people nullify the estimated negative 
effect of market power on loan quantity provided by the formal banking sector at the 0.10
th
, 
0.25
th
 and 0.90
th
 quintiles respectively while the corresponding counteracting threshold of 
internet penetration is considerably lower at 9.485 per 100 people only at the 0.90
th
 quintile. 
On average, between 2009 and 2011: (i) countries that do not meet the mobile phone 
penetration thresholds are Eritrea, Burundi, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda and Sierra Leon and (ii) countries that meet the internet penetration threshold 
are Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde , Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.  
The decision to complement an estimation technique, such as the GMM-IV approach 
which is based on conditional mean values of the dependent variable with a QR method that is 
based on multiple points of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable is apparent 
from our findings. These have revealed that blanket policies of information diffusion for the 
purpose of dampening market power for financial access may not be effective unless they are 
contingent on the initial levels of financial access across countries.  
 A likely explanation as to why information diffusion reduces the adverse impact of 
market power on access to credit is related to the fact that innovative schemes such as mobile 
banking has helped to decrease the overly reliance on the formal banking sector for loans.  
Such could encourage banks, especially the large size financial institutions to lower  ( raise) 
the price (quantity) of loans in the formal credit market.  
 In the light of the above, the broad implications of this study are twofold: First, 
policies designed to boost ICT penetration in Africa would disproportionately increase the 
quantity of loan provided by the formal banking sector by reducing their market power in the 
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African financial industry. Second, the statistically insignificant coefficient reported in the QR 
regressions for loan price is taken as an indication that ICT could be supplemented with other 
tools such as information sharing offices (involving public credit registries and private credit 
bureaus). Such complementarity should also be contingent on the initial levels of financial 
access in the country concerned. In summary, by adopting measures of universal ICT access, 
policy makers can substantially increase access to credit by households and corporations.  
Such universal access schemes may include the liberalisation of the ICT sector aimed at 
speeding up internet connections at relatively low prices.  
Future inquires devoted to improve extant literature can focus on alternative 
instruments with which market power can be dampened in order to enhance financial access 
in the African banking industry. For instance, the roles of information sharing offices, mobile 
banking and financial sector competition can be considered.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary of expected signs  
  
Variables 
Expected sign on loan 
price 
Expected sign on loan 
quantity 
    
Bank-oriented 
features  
Deposit/Asset ratio   + + 
Bank Branches  - + 
    
Market-related 
characteristics  
GDP per capita growth Uncertain  + 
Population density  + + 
Inflation  + - 
    
Characteristics of the 
unobserved 
heterogeneity  
Small versus(vs). Big  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
domestic vs. foreign  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
Islamic vs. non-Islamic  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
    
 
 
Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Mobile Phones  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Internet Penetration   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Market Power Lerner index The ratio of the ‘difference between the 
Marginal Cost and Price’ on the Price 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Loan Quantity   Quantity Logarithm of Loans  Quantity BankScope 
    
Price (charged on 
Loans or Quantity) 
Price (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total 
Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets 
BankScope 
    
GDP per capita  GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Populaton density  Pop. People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  Bbrchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
Small Banks Ssize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period) ≤ 0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Large Banks Lsize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)>0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
    
Domestic/Foreign 
banks   
Dom/Foreign Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative 
information: creation date, headquarters, 
government/private ownership, % of foreign 
ownership, year of foreign/domestic 
ownership…etc 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis.  
    
Islamic/Non-Islamic  Islam/NonIsl. Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial 
statement characteristics (trading in 
derivatives and interest on loan 
payments…etc) 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis; Beck 
et al. (2010); Ali 
(2012). 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, Open, 
Close, Dom/Foreign and Islam/NonIsl.   
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Appendix 3: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
ICT Mobile 34.107 32.409 0.000 147.202 1776 
       
 Internet 7.268 8.738 0.037 51.000 1757 
       
Market 
Power 
Lerner 0.513 0.587 0.032 0.969 893 
       
Dependent 
variables  
Price of Loans 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
Quantity of Loans (ln) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
       
       
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita growth 13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
Bank level 
variables  
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
       
 
 
 
Dummy 
variables   
Small Size  0.804 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Large Size  0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Domestic  0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Foreign  0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Islamic  0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Non-Islamic  0.962 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
       
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix  
                 
Market-Level Controls Bank-Level Controls Dummy-Controls ICT Lerner  
GDP Infl. Pop. D/A Bbrchs Price Quantity Ssize Lsize Dom. Foreign Islam NonIsl. Mobile Internet   
1.000 0.136 0.007 -0.008 -0.068 -0.014 -0.026 -0.0002 0.0002 0.034 -0.034 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.261 -0.122 -0.016 GDP 
 1.000 -0.028 0.037 -0.236 0.256 -0.009 0.046 -0.046 0.028 -0.028 -0.050 0.050 -0.315 -0.238 -0.062 Inf. 
  1.000 0.112 0.410 -0.029 -0.125 -0.098 0.098 -0.045 0.045 -0.088 0.088 0.056 0.335 0.035 Pop. 
   1.000 -0.041 0.080 0.306 -0.041 0.041 -0.062 0.062 -0.210 0.210 -0.087 -0.036 0.021 D/A 
    1.000 -0.266 -0.227 -0.078 0.078 0.135 -0.135 -0.051 0.051 0.610 0.747 0.109 Bbrchs 
     1.000 -0.075 0.094 -0.094 0.016 -0.016 -0.097 0.097 -0.206 -0.219 0.082 Price 
      1.000 -0.171 0.171 0.052 -0.052 -0.067 0.067 -0.096 -0.118 -0.038 Quantity 
       1.000 -1.000 0.026 -0.026 -0.020 0.020 0.146 0.089 -0.056 Ssize 
        1.000 -0.026 0.026 0.020 -0.020 -0.146 -0.089 0.056 Lsize 
         1.000 -1.000 0.089 -0.089 0.151 0.039 0.147 Dom. 
          1.000 -0.089 0.089 -0.151 0.039 -0.147 Foreign 
           1.000 -1.000 -0.045 -0.039 0.006 Islam 
            1.000 0.045 -0.032 -0.006 NonIsl. 
             1.000 0.634 0.089 Mobile 
              1.000 0.048 Internet 
               1.000 Lerner 
                 
Info: Information. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population growth. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. Szize: Small banks. Lsize: Large banks. Domestic: Domestic banks. 
Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks.  Price: Price of Loans. Quantity: Quantity of Loans. ICT: Information and Communication Technology. Mobile: mobile phone penetration. 
Internet: internet penetration.  Lerner: Market Power 
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